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body, or make a chemical examination of the contents of the alimentary tube; and, should he be subpcmnaed to attend an investigation, it is only admissible to testify as to facts within his own
knowledge, and he can refuse respectfully and firmly to go further.
The members of the profession of medicine everywhere are, as a
class, beneficent and self-sacrificing, laboring always cheerfully and
gratuitously in the cause of humanity and in the service of the
destitute. But they, too, must live while they thus labor, and it
cannot be expected by government, they should serve the wealthy
in their most professional position without the obligation being
recognized and requited.
I cannot bring this report to a conclusion without acknowledging
the important aid and counsel so cheerfully extended by Drs. D.
Francis Condie, of Pennsylvania, and Grafton Tyler, of Georgetown, D. 0., my colleagues on the Committee appointed at the Philadelphia meeting of the National Medical Association.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the Philadeilia Court of Oyer and Terminer.
COMMONWEALTH vS. "MI.ETH.
1. The test, in insanity, is the power or capacity of aprisoner to distinguish between
right and wrong in reference to the particular act in question.
2. If the prisoner labors under partial insanity, hallucination or delusion, but nevertheless did understand the nature of his act, and knew that it was criminal, and
bad sufficient mental power to apply that knowledge to his own case, and if he
had sufficient memory to recollect his relations to and with others, and that the
act committed was against justice and right, and a violation of the dictates of
duty, be is responsible. Per LuiDLoW, J.

The following charge was delivered to the jury by
LuDLow, J.-The defence in this case is that the prisoner, at the
time of the commission of this offence, was not an accountable being.
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If, gentlemen of the jury, this allegation is true, it would be monstrous to punish him, and therefore we find the law to be that if one
charged with the commission of crime is so entirely devoid of understanding as to be either an idiot or a madman, he is thereby acquitted of all guilt; he is not criminally responsible to the offended
majesty of the law, but becomes at once rather an object of pity
than the subject of punishment.
Gentlemen, it is unnecessary for me to say to you that we will be
obliged to investigate a most delicate and dangerous subject ; nevertheless, we will endeavor to lay down such rules and tests as will
enable you to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion.
If the prisoner at the bar, at the time he committed the act, had
not sufficient capacity to know whether his act was right or wrong,
and whether it was contrary to law, he is not responsible. This is,
in fact, general insanity, so far as the act in question is concerned,
and it must be so great in extent and degree as to blind him to the
natural consequences of his moral duty, and must have utterly destroyed his perception of right and wrong.
The test in this instance, as you perceive, is thepower or capaeciy.
of a prisoner to distinguish between right and wrong in reference
to the particularact in question; for although a man may be sane
upon every other subject, yet, if he be mad, to use an expressive
phrase, upon the subject, and so far as the act under immediate investigation is concerned, he thereby loses that control of hismental
powers which renders him a responsible being. The test thus suggested has been adopted by the judges of England, and by the courts.
of our own State, and is too well settled to be shaken.
But suppose that the prisoner was able to distinguish between
right and wrong, and yet was laboring under a partial insanity,.
hallucinationor delusion, which drove him to the commission of the
act as a duty of overwhelming necessity, is he in such cases responsible for his acts ?
If the delusion were of such a nature as to induce the prisoner to.
believe in the real existence of facts which were entirely imaginary,.
but which, if true, would have been a good defence, he would not be.
responsible. We, however, desire at this stage of our remarks to refer
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rather to other delusions than the class thus spoken of, reserving
for future consideration our remarks on this branch of the subject.
That partial insanity, hallucination or delusion, coupled with the
power of discriminating between right and wrong, was no excuse
for crime, has been ruled to be the law of England, and to this point
did the judges of England refer in McNaughten's case, 10 Clark &
Fin. 210, in their first answer to the questions propounded to them
by the House of Lords. This doctrine was also stated to be the law
by our predecessors upon this bench in the case of Commonwealth
vs. Farkin, 2 Parsons Se. Eq. Ca., p. 431, and would have remained
the law in this State but for the opinion and charge of Chief Justice
Gibson in Com. vs. Mosler, 4 Barr, 266, where the Chief Justice says:
"It (insanity) must amount to delusion, or hallucination, controlling
his will and making the commission of the act a duty of overruling
necessity." And, again, he says: "The law is, that whether insanity
be general or partial, it must be so great as to have controlled the
will of its subject, and to have taken from him the freedom of moral
action."
Medical writers agree that instances constantly occur of the commission of acts of killing by those who not only know that the act
about to be committed is wrong, but that punishment is affixed to its
commision by law.
We cannot, however, leave this branch of the subject to doubt or
uncertainty, and our conclusion is, after a somewhat extended
investigation of the law, that the proper rule to be adopted upon the
point in question is the following:
If the prisoner, although he labors under partial insanity, hallucination or delusion, did understand the nature and character of his
act, had a knowledge that it was wrong and criminal, and mental
power sufficient to apply that knowledge to his own case, and knew
if he did the act he would do wrong, and would receive punishment;
if, further, he had sufficient power of memory to recollect the relation in which he stood to others, and others stood to him, that the
act in question was contrary to the plain dictates of justice and right,
injurious to others, and a violation of the dictates of duty, he would
be responsible.
A. man must, therefore, labor under something more than "a
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mere moral obliquity of perception," and "a man whose mind
squints, unless impelled to crime by this very mental obliquity, is
as much amenable to punishment as one whose eye squints."
The jury must, therefore, even though they believe the prisoner
labored under a diseased and unsound state of mind, be satisfied
that this diseased or unsound state of mind existed to such a degree,
that although he could distinguish between right and wrong, yet
with reference to the act in question, his reason, conscience and
judgment were so entirely perverted, as to render the commission
of the act in question a duty of overwhelming necessity.
But, gentlemen, there is another species of delusion entirely
distinct from those which we have just considered, which is recognized by the law, and which, when the jury believe that it clearly
exists, will entitle the prisoner to an acquittal. I refer to that
delusion by reason of which the prisoner commits the act under a
fixed bona fide belief (which is a delusion) that certain facts existed
which were wholly imaginary, but which if true would have been
a good defence.
The judges of England, in their answer to the fourth question
propounded to them by the House of Lords, saye-supposing that
one labors under partial delusion and is not in other respects insane,
"We think he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists
were real. For example, if, under the influence of delusion, he
supposes a man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life,
and he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defence, he would be
exempt from punishment.
"If his delusion was, that the deceased had inflicted a serious
injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge,
he would be liable to punishment."
Bat, gentlemen, if this spirit of delusion existed, the act charged
against the prisoner must be the direct result of this delusion, and
the delusion must have been directly connected with the act driving
him to its commission, and must have been such a delusion which, if
it had been a reality instead of an imagination, would have justified
him in taking life.
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Besides the kinds of insanity to which I have already referred,
and which strictly 'speaking affect the mind only, we have moral or
homicidal insanity, which seems to be an irresistible inclinationto
kill or to commit some other particularoffence. We are obliged by

the force of authority to say to you, that there is such a disease
known to the law as homicidal insanity; what it is, or in what it
consists, no lawyer or judge has ever yet been able to explain with
precision; physicians, especially those having charge of the insane,
gradually, it would seem, come to the conclusion, that all wicked
men are mad, and many of the judges have so far fallen into the
same error as to render it possible for any man to escape the penalty
which the law affixes to crime.
We do not intend to be understood as expressing the opinion that
in some instances human beings are not afflicted with a homicidal
mania, but we do intend to say that a defence consisting exclusively
of this species of insanity, has frequently been made the means by
which a notorious offender has escaped punishment. What, then, is
that form of disease, denominated homicidal mania, which will excuse
one for having committed a murder?
Chief Justice Gibson calls it, "that unseen ligament pressing on
the mind, and drawing it to consequences which it sees but cannot
avoid, and placing it under a coercion which, while its results are
clearly perceived, is incapable of resistance"-" an irresistible inclination to kill."
If by moral insanity is to be understood only a disordered or
perverted state of the affections or moral powers of the mind, it
cannot be too soon discarded as affording any shield from punishment for crime; if it can be truly said that one who indulges in
violent emotions, such as remorse, anger, shame, grief, and the like,
is afflicted with homicidal insanity, it will be difficult, yes, impossible,
to say where sanity ends and insanity begins; for, by way of illustration, the man who is lashed into fury by a fit of anger is in one
sense insane.
As a general rule it will be found that instances are rare of cases
of homicidal insanity occurring wherein the mania is not of a general nature,and results in a desire to kill any and every person who
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may chance to fall within the range of the maniac's malevolence; as
it is general, so also is it based upon imaginary and not real wrongs;
if it is directed against a particular person (as is sometimes the
case,) then also the cause of the act will generally be imaginary;
when, therefore, the jury find from the evidence that the act has
been the result not of an imaginary but real wrong, they will take
care to examine with great caution into the circumstances of the
case, so that with the real wrong, they may not also discover revenge, anger, and kindred emotions of the mind to be the real motive
which has occasioned the homicidal act.
Orfila has said, "That the mind is always greatly troubled when
it is agitated by anger, tormented by an unfortunate love, bewildered
by jealousy, overcome by despair, haunted by terror, or corrupted
by an unconquerable desire for vengeance. Then, as is commonly
said, a man is no longer master of himself, his reason is affected,
his ideas are in disorder, he is like a madman. But in all these
cases a man does not lose his knowledge of the real relations of
things, he may exaggerate his misfortune, but this misfortune is real,
and if it carry him to commit a criminal act, this act is perfectly
well motived."
The man who has a clear conception of the various relations of
life, and the real relations of things, is not often afflicted with insanity
of any description. Re may become angry, and in a fit of temper
kill his enemy, or even his friend, but this is not, and I hope never
will be, called in courts of justice insanity. Again, one who is
really driven on by an uncontrollable impulse to the commission of
a crime, will be able to show its "1contemporaneous existence evinced
by present circumstances, or the existence of an habitual tendency
developed in particular cases, and becoming in itself a second nature,"
and ought further to show that the mania "was habitual, or that it
had evinced itself in more than one instance."
Chief Justice Lewis has said that moral insanity "bears a striking
resemblance to vice ;" and further, "it ought never to be admitted
as a defence until it is shown that these propensities exist in such
violence as to subjugate the intellect, control the will, and render it
impossible for the party to do otherwise than yield." And again,
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"this state of mind is not to be presumed without evidence, nor
does it usually occur without some premonitory symptons indicating
its approach."
Gentlemen of the jury, we say to you, as the result of our reflections on this branch of the subject, that if the prisoner was actuated
by an irresistible inclination to kill, and was utterly unable to control
his will or subjugate his intellect, and was not actuated by anger,
jealousy, revenge, and kindred evil passions, he is entitled to an
acquittal, provided the jury believe that the state of mind now
referred to has been proven to have existed, without doubt, and to
their satisfaction.
The judge then reviewed at length the evidence, and called the
attention of the jury to the act of Assembly regulating the degrees
of murder, and also to that act which requires a jury, when the
defence is insanity, to say so if they so believe, and also to find if
the prisoner is acquitted on that ground; and, after calling upon
the jury in the most solemn manner to discharge their whole duty,
he committed the prisoner to their charge, saying: "If the prisoner,
by reason of mental infirmity, is not a responsible being, acquit
him; but if you believe him to be guilty, in that event consign him
to that doom which is the direct result of his own act."
The prisoner was acquitted.

In the District Court of the United States, Wisconsin .District

In Equity.
THE CLEVELAND INSURANCE COMPANY vs. GEORGE REED AND JULIET S.
REED HIS IVIFE, JAMES H. ROGERS, AND THE MILWAUKEE AND MISSISSIPPI RAILROAD COMPANY.
1. Where a power of attorney is given by three tenants in common of village lots,
for the sale, leasing, and absolute disposal of al or any part of their interest in
said lots, and the attorney: conveys the share of one of the principals, and takes a
conveyance back, and then mortgages the same interest for money loaned, all at
the same time, the mortgage is, in equity, the mortgage of the principal.
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2. A purchaser under decrees of foreclosure of prior mortgages cannot take advantage of the want of power of the attorney; but he can inquire into the true consideration of the mortgage.
3. Usury must be specially pleaded, or specifically set forth on the record, and supported by evidence, or the court will not inquire into it.
4. The statute limiting suits in chancery to ten years, should be applied to a suit to
foreclose a mortgage against a purchaser under prior mortgages, brought seventeen years after the mortgage debt was payable, the mortgage given, and the
mortgage debt payable before the statute took effect-particularly when the
mortgagee had notice within two years after the sale under the prior mortgages,
and that the purchaser was in possession of the premises claiming title.
5. Without such a statute, equity would not disturb the possession or title of such
a purchaser, as the demand i§ stale; and there must be conscience, good faith,
and reasonable diligence to call into action the powers of a court of equity.
6. Quere.-Whether by analogy to the statutes of the State limiting the time for the
redemption of lands sold for debt, a subsequent mortgagee, not a party to a bill of
a prior mortgagee to foreclose, should maintain a bill in equity to redeem after
two years, against a purchaser under a decree on theprior mortgage?

The opinion of the court, in which the facts are sufficiently set
forth, was delivered by
MILLER, J.-It is set forth in the bill, that on the tenth day of
February, 1837, George Reed made, and delivered to complainant,
three promissory notes-one for $7,250, payable in one year; one
for $7,500, payable in eighteen months ; one for $7,250, payable
in two years, with interest after one year-amounting to $22,000.
And that said Reed and wife, to secure the payment of said
debt, did, at the same time, execute and deliver to complainant a
mortgage of certain lots and lands, described as "being twenty
acres of land, situate, lying and being in the town and county of
Milwaukee and Territory of Wisconsin, equal and undivided, in all
those pieces or parcels of land, known as Finch's Addition to the
town of Milwaukee, after excepting blocks numbered fifteen (15),
sixteen (16), twenty-one (21), and twenty-eight (28) ; also, lots numbered five (5) and ten (10) in block numbered twenty-nine (29); lot
numbered five (5) block numbered thirty-six (86), and lots numbered
four (4) and five (5) in block numbered forty-four (44), as designated
in the recorded plat of said addition. Said twenty acres subject to
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all streets and alleys laid out in said addition, and all legal highways." "And thirty-six acres of land equal and undivided, in
those two tracts of land situate in the county of Milwaukee and Territory of Wisconsin, described as lots numbered two (2) and three
(3) in section numbered twenty-one (21), in township numbered
seven, north of range numbered twenty-two east in said territory,
in the district of lands subject to sale at Milwaukee, containing
1 8 0yJq acres of land."
The mortgage was recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds
for Milwaukee county, on the twenty-seventh of April, 1837.
The plat of Finch's addition was vacated by an act of the legislature, approved March 31st, 1855, and the said parcel of land is
now known and described as the south-east quarter of section thirty
of township seven, range twenty-two east. The complainant claims
to have a lien on an undivided twenty acres of said quarter section.
And James H. Rogers and the Milwaukee and Mississippi Railroad
Company have, or claim, some interest in the mortgaged premises,
as subsequent purchasers, incumbrancers, or otherwise, but subject
to complainant's lien. A decree of sale of the mortgaged premises
is prayed.
The bill was filed and subpoena issued on the twelfth day of
February, 1856.
George Reed filed an answer, in which he admits the execution
and delivery of the notes and mortgage, he then being justly
indebted to complainant in the sum of $22,000. And he admits
that the plat of Finch's Addition was vacated by an act of the
Legislature; and that the land is now known and designated as the
south-east quarter of section thirty of township seven, range twentytwo east. And by virtue of said mortgage, the complainant has a
lien on one undivided twenty acres in said quarter section. And
he admits that $22,000, the amount of said notes and mortgage,
with interest, still remains due and unpaid. He pleads that, in the
month of December, 1842, he was discharged from his debts, under
the bankrupt law of the United States, by the Supreme Court of
,the Territory of Wisconsin.
James H. Rogers, in his answer, states that George Reed never

INSURANCE COMPANY vs. REED ET AL.

had any business transactions with complainant, except through one
Edmund Clark, who, at the date of the mortgage and ever since,
was the president of the corporation. He says that he is the owner
in fee simple of the south-east quarter of section 30, of town. 7,
range 22; and that he has been in the full and actual possession,
as the owner thereof, for the last nineteen years, and fenced and
cultivated it. And he has resided in Milwaukee constantly, where
he could at all times be found. He pleads that he has been in the
actual occupation of the land for more than ten years since the
right of action on the mortgage accrued, and before the commencement of this suit; and that the right of action is barred by the
statute of limitations of this State, the right of action having accrued
more than ten years before the bill was filed.
Rogers further answers, that neither George Reed nor the complainant ever had any title to, or any equitable or just claim to, or
lien on said mortgaged premises. That the twenty acres were the
property of Curtis Reed. And Edmund Clark was the president of
the insurance company, and the owner of the controlling interest in
its capital stock. George Reed, as the attorney in fact of Curtis
Reed, conveyed said twenty acres undivided to Clark, by a deed
bearing date the same day of the mortgage, for the pretended, or
nominal consideration of $20,000. And on the same day and time,
at Cleveland, Ohio, Clark conveyed the same to George Reed, for
the pretended, or nominal consideration of $30,000, who gave to
the insurance company the notes and mortgage. These conveyances and mortgage were given in the absence of Curtis Reed, and
without his knowledge or consent; and they are all parts of one
corrupt and fraudulent transaction, and without any benefit to Curtis Reed ;-and that it was a fraud upon Curtis Reed and those
claiming, under him, any interest in the land.
Rogers also sets forth in his answer, that Curtis Reed, prior to
the execution of the mortgage, gave a mortgage of the land to
Nathaniel Finch, for $2,000 and interest; and another mortgage
upon his remaining interest of the quarter of section thirty, to B.
W. Finch, for $2,266; and both these mortgages were recorded
before the mortgage of complainant. Those two mortgages were
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assigned to the defendant Rogers, for a valuable consideration,
before due, who caused them to be foreclosed by two suits in the
Territorial District Court for Milwaukee County. And the land
was sold to him, (Rogers) and the sales were confirmed and deeds
made.
Rogers further sets up title to the land under a sale by the
assignee of George Reed, of his interest in the land.
And he pleads that the conveyances and mortgage were a device
to avoid the laws of usury; and that the notes and mortgage are
void, as being in violation of the laws of Ohio, or New York, or
Wisconsin.
He also claims title by means of sundry tax deeds; and, also,
that he has paid the taxes.
He insists that the cause of action is stale, and should not be
enforced in equity. He also insists that it is nowhere stated in the
bill, that the money as claimed to have been loaned, was part of the
capital of the insurance company. And that the charter of the
company gives no power to deal in real estate, or to loan money
except of the corporate funds. And that the mortgage for that
reason is void. And that the company has long since ceased to
exist, and is incapable of bringing this suit.
Defendant Rogers disclaims any interest in lots 2 and 3 of section
21, town. 7, range 22, described in the mortgage and bill.
A replication is filed to the answer of James H. Rogers.
The Milwaukee and Mississippi Railroad Company makes no
defence.
By the deed of Benoni W. Finch and wife, to Curtis Reed, dated
April 23d, 1836, fifteen acres undivided, and also five acres Vndivided in section 30, town. 7, range 22, were conveyed. And by the
deed of Nathaniel Finch and wife, to Curtis Reed, dated April
26th, 1836, seventeen and a half acres undivided in the same section
were conveyed.
On the 23d June, 1836, B. W. Finch and wife, and N. Finch and
wife, and Curtis Reed, gave to George Reed a power of attorney
"to contract for the sale, leasing, and absolute disposal of all or any
part of our interest in the village lots laid out in the south-east

INSURANCE COMPANY vs. REED ET AL.

quarter of section No. 80, in township 7,range 22, in the Territory
of Wisconsin, known and designated as Finch's addition; and on
such terms as to our said attorney shall seem meet. And also absolutely to sell, convey, or lease, and in our names and behalf to
execute all deeds or instruments that may be necessary to carry
into full effect the powers hereby conferred; and enable our said
attorney to make such disposition of all or any part of our interests
in the premises above described, as effectually as we ourselves might
do, excepting and reserving unto ourselves, respectively, the sole
right of selling the several lots and blocks therein described. And
the said attorney is to retain five per cent. on the amount of rates
which he shall effect, and his expenses to be refunded."
Instead of making sales and leases of lots as contemplated, George
Reed, as the attorney of Curtis Reed, under the power, on the 10th
February, 1837, in Cleveland, Ohio, conveyed by warranty deed to
Edmund Clark, "twenty acres of land undivided of that tract known
as Finch's addition to the town of Milwaukee, excepting the lots and
blocks excepted in the power of attorney, and as designated in the
recorded plat of said addition, and subject to all streets and alleys
laid out in said addition, and also subject to all legal highways."
And on the same day and at the same place, Edmund Clark conveyed by quit claim deed, the same land with the same description
to George Reed, who, with his wife, gave back the mortgage in suit
and the notes, to the Cleveland Insurance Company.
Edmund Clark has been examined as a witness, and he testified
that these several conveyances and the notes and the mortgage were
executed and delivered at the same time, and were the same transaction. It is certain George Reed could not use the power of attorney so as to acquire title to the land adverse to or exclusive of that
of his principal, Custis Reed. In equity it is Custis Reed's mortgage, although at law it is George Reed's personal obligation or
contract.
Clark testifies that he thinks the mortgage was to be on the same
twenty acres that were conveyed to him. The description in the
deeds and mortgage, in connection with the power of attorney, and
its recital in the deed to Clark, confine the mortgage to Curtis Reed's
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twenty acres. This mortgage does not cover any interest of George
Reed in that section, which he then held. Everything connected
with the transaction excludes the idea that the mortgage is upon
any land in that section but Curtis Reed's. The purchase by Rogers
of George Reed's interest in the section of land at his assignee's
sale, does not affect this mortgage. George Reed's bankruptcy,
and the proceedings and the sale under them, have nothing whatever
to do with this case, so far as James H. Rogers is concerned. The
return of this debt by Qeorge Reed, in the schedule annexed to
his petition in bankruptcy, cannot in any way affect the interests
or rights of Curtis Reed and James H. Rogers in regard to the mortgage or the mortgaged premises.
This mortgage was a security for money loaned, and the insurance
company had authority by its charter to take security for money
loaned as part of its capital.
Clark testifies, that the amount paid Reed was entered on the books
of the company, as paid by it. That he made the arrangement
with Reed after consulting some of the directors. He also testifies that eleven thousand dollars, part in cash and part in paper, was
the true sum advanced, and was the true consideration. The other
eleven thousand was the consideration of a guarantee that the mortgaged premises would be worth the amount, when the notes should
become payable; and also a private note of $3,000 was given by
Reed as a penalty for the punctual payment of the notes. The
notes were given in Ohio, and were made payable in New York,
and the mortgage is on land in Wisconsin. The pleadings do not
authorize the court to inquire into the subject of usury. They are
altogether too indefinite and uncertain. Usury must be specially
pleaded, and the evidence must sustain the plea. The whole transaction appears to have been a desperate device of George Reed to
make a raise of money, and an unwarrantable scheme of Clark to
embarrass a customer. Rogers pleads in his answer, that the transaction was a violation of the usury laws of either the States of Ohio,
New York or Wisconsin, and is void. Upon such pleading I shall
not examine the subject; nor shall I stop to inquire whether Rogers
could plead usury without tendering the amount actually loaned,
with interest.
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A power to sell lands, usually includes a power to mortgage; but
a mortgage under such a power for a greater sum than is actually
loaned, may be repudiated by the principal. Curtis Reed might
have required the cancellation of the conveyances and mortgage, at
all events, upon payment of the sum loaned. But Rogers is a
stranger to the transaction, and he cannot make the objection to
the validity of the mortgage. He can only cause inquiry to be
made of its true consideration, if it is a lien on his land. Jackcson
ex dem McCarty vs. Van -Dosfen, 5 Johns. 43; Childs vs.
Digby, 12 Harris, 23.
Rogers became the assignee of the two mortgages of Curtis Reed
to the Finches, dated in April, 1836. In pursuance of decrees of
the District Court for Milwaukee county, at the suit of Rogers
against Curtis Reed, Edmund Clark and others, the mortgaged
premises were sold in satisfaction of those mortgages to Rogers: a
deed was made to him of the premises, by the master, according to
the order of confirmation of the sales. Those mortgages being
prior liens, Rogers became the purchaser of the legal title. The
mortgage in suit is dated in February, 1837, and is of Curtis Reed's
equity of redemption merely. An ejectment would not lie, at the
suit of this mortgagee against Rogers, the owner of the legal title.
The only remedy of the complainant is by bill in equity for the sale
of the mortgaged premises, which is this bill, or for redemption;
and the subject matter is of the peculiar and exclusive jurisdiction
of a court of equity.
At the date of this mortgage there was no statute limiting suits
in equity. An act went into force in the month of July, 1839, that
"Bills for relief in case of the existence of a trust not cognizable
in the courts of common law, and in all other cases not herein provided for, shall be filed within ten years after the cause thereof shall
accrue, and not after." This limitation was continued in the State
statutes of 1849, and is now in full force. This mortgage is dated
Feb. 10, 1887. The first note is payable in twelve months, the
second in eighteen months, and the third in two years. When the
act of limitations went into force, the cause of action had accrued.
This court will administer statutes of limitation of the State, as
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rules of property. I shall proceed to inquire whether the statute is
applicable to this case.
This case is one of the "cases not provided for" in the statute.
If the word hereafter had been inserted in the statute (as in similar
laws of some of the States), so that it would read "hereafter accrue," the question would be relieved of doubt. The statute seems
to direct the attention to such causes of action as shall accrue, and
not to those that had then accrued. The Supreme Court of this
State have applied this statute to causes of action accrued at the
time of its enactment. Fullerton vs. Spring,3 Wis. R. 667 ; Parker vs. Kane, 4 id. 1. This statute was copied from the statute of
the State of New York. In that State a contrary application of
the statute was made in Williamson vs. Ford,2 Sandford Oh. Rep.
534, 570, and cases cited. In those cases the general rule is announced, that no statute is to have a retrospect beyond the time of
its commencement, and to affect vested rights unless expressly so
declared. But in the subsequent case of Svarr vs. Mills, 3 Barbour's Ch. Rep. 199, it is decided that an equitable claim, upon
which a bill in chancery could have been filed, previous to the time
when the statute first took effect, and when the complainant was
under no legal disability, is barred by the provisions of the statute
at the expiration of ten years after the statute went into operation.
The statute of the State of Massachusetts, in its general provisions
as to claims that shall accrue, is the same as the statutes of New
York and of Wisconsin; and a similar application is there made.
Smith vs. Mlorrison, 22 Pick. Rep. 430. Sedgewick on Statute of
.Lim. 691. The legislature of the State of Mississippi passed an
act, in the month of February, 1844, that judgments rendered before the passage of the act, in any other State of the Union, should
be barred, unless suit was brought thereou within two years after
the passage of the act. In the case of the Bank of Alabama vs.
Dalton, 9 Howard, 522, it is decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States that, the act could be pleaded in bar to an action on
a judgment rendered in the State of Alabama one year previous to
its passage, and that the Constitution of the United States did not
prohibit that legislation as a law impairing the obligation of con-
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tracts. The time and manner of the operation of statutes of limitations generally depend on the sound discretion of the legislature.
Cases, though, may occur, when the provisions of a law may be so
unreasonable, as to amount to a denial of right, and call for the interposition of the court. A statute of limitations affects the remedy,
not the contract, where a reasonable time is given for bringing suit
on existing demands. See also on this subject the opinions of the
court in Jackson vs. Lamphire, 8 Peters, 289; Sturgis vs. Crownenshield, 4 Wheat. 206 ; Bronson vs. Kinzie, I Howard, 311 ;
McCracken vs. Baywood, 2 id. 608 ; Lewis vs. Lewis, 7 id. 776 ;
14Kc.Elmoyle vs. Cohen, 13 Peters, 312; (Jall vs. ftagger, 8 Mass.
Rep. '429; Hlolyoke vs. Haskins, 5 Pick. 26; Smith vs.
Morison, 22 id. 431 ; Morse vs. Gould, 1 Kernan, 281. In Ross &'
Zing vs. -Duval, 18 Peters, 45, the court remark :-1" It is a sound
principle that, when a statute of limitation prescribes the time
within which suits shall be brought or an act done, and part of the
time has elapsed, effect may be given to the act ; and time yet to
run being a reasonable part of the whole time, will be considered
the limitation in the mind of the legislature in such cases." From
a careful examination of the case of Murray vs. Gibson, 15 Howard, 421, it will appear that that decision does not conflict with the
previous decisions of the court. The act of the State of Mississippi,
passed in March, 1846, as an amendment to the limitation law of
the State, provided that, "no record of any judgment recovered in
any court of record without the limits of the State, against any
person who was, at the time of the commencement of the suit, on
which the judgment is founded, or at the time of the rendition of
such judgment, a citizen of this State, shall be received as evidence
to charge such citizen, after the expiration of three years from the
time of the rendition of such judgment without the limits of this
State." The declaration was in debt, on a judgment rendered in
the State of Louisiana in the month of November, 1844. By the
literal terms of the act, the rights of a judgment creditor seem to be
made dependent, not on his diligence in the institution or prosecution of his suit, but upon the trial of the action on his judgment,
which is an event over which he can have no control. The peculiar
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language of the act, if taken in its literal acceptation, might suggest
a serious doubt as to the compatibility of its provision, with the
principles of common right, or with the federal constitution. For
these reasons the courts construed the law to relate to the time of
bringing the suit and not to the time of offering the record in evidence at the trial; and also confined its operation to judgments
rendered in other States after its date. In addition to these reasons
the law of the same State as then existing, and on which the case
of the Bank of Alabama vs. Dalton, was ruled, was applicable to
the case of Murray vs. Gibson, and would have barred it if pleaded.
The court applied the law to judgments rendered after its date, to
prevent the injustice intended by the legislature, of excluding judgment records at the trial. The court remark-" That laws should
be so construed as not to allow a retroactive operation, where this is
not required by express command, or by necessary, or unavoidable implication. Especially should this rule of interpretation prevail, when the effect and operation are designed, apart from the intrinsic merits of the rights of parties, to restrict the operation of
those rights."
This bill was filed nineteen years after the date of the mortgage;
seventeen years after the whole cause of action had accrued; and
sixteen years and five months after the statute of limitations went
into force. The complainant was under no legal disability, and
might have brought suit before the ten years prescribed by the law
had expired. I am of the opinion that this case should be considered
as barred by the statute; but it is not essential to the proper disposition of the case, that the bill be dismissed on this ground.
In the year 1840 the sales to Rogers, in foreclosure of the Finch
mortgages, were confirmed, and deeds were executed and delivered,
when he went into possession. Clark testifies that, "I think I first
began to look after this real estate in 1841 or '42. We got a man,
who was going up there, to look into it, and he came back with
rather a poor story. I first learned that James H. Rogers was in
possession of the property ten. years ago, perhaps more. I wrote to
some gentlemen in Milwaukee, and they wrote me that Rogers was
in possession, claiming title. The information which JoLn W. Allen
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gave us, who we requested to look after our interests in Milwaukee,
and who went there, was, that the thirty-six acres embraced in the
mortgage had been foreclosed and sold- on a previous mortgage, and
that the twenty acres in Finch's addition embraced in the same
mortgage, had been sold at several tax sales, and that it was not
then valued at over ten dollars per acre. This statement was made
in 1841 or 1842. This Mr. Allen was the first President and a
stockholder in the Cleveland Insurance Company." Rogers has
continued in actual possession, and has paid the taxes mostly by
suffering the property to be sold, and then taking deeds, and has
made valuable improvements. The property has become very
valuable, not from any labor, expenditure or exertion of the complainant. It is the policy of this new State that titles should be
quieted. The growth and improvement of the State requiring this
policy, the legislature have wisely limited the time for bringini,
ejectments to ten years. Clark, the controlling officer of the Insurance company, had notice, by his agent, and a stockholder of the
company, that Rogers was in possession fifteen years before this bill
was filed. From these facts, this bill should not be maintained
against Rogers at this late day. From the delay in bringing suit,
after the notice that Rogers was in possession, claiming title to.the.
land not considered worth the costs of a suit, the demand may be
considered as abandoned or stale. In this respect this case somewhat resembles the case of McKnight vs. Taylor, 1 Howard, 161;.
in which it was remarked by the Court-" In relation to this claim,.
it appears that nineteen years and three months were suffered to.
elapse before any application was made for the execution of the
trust by which it had been secured. No reason is assigned for this.
delay, nor is it alleged to have been occasioned, in any, degree,.by
obstacles thrown in the way of the appellant. If,indeed, this.suit
had been postponed a few months longer, twenty years would,have.
expired, and in that case, according to the vrhole current of authori-.
ties, the debt would have been presumed to be paid.. But. we do.
not found our judgment upon the presumption of payment; for it is,
not merely on the presumption of payment, or in analogy to the.
statute of limitations, that a court of chancery refuses to lend its aidL
27
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to stale demands. There*must be conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence, to call into action the powers of the court. In
matters of account, where they are not barred by the act of -limitations, courts of equity refuse to interfere after a considerable lapse
of time, from considerations of public policy; and from the difficulty
of doing entire justice when the original transactions have become
obscure by time, and the evidence may be lost. The rule upon this
subject must be considered as settled by the decision of the court in
the case of Piatt v. 'Fattier,9 Peters, 416; and that nothing can
-call a court of chancery into activity but conscience, good faith and
reasonable diligence; and when these are wanting, the court is pas'sive and does nothing, and therefore, from the beginning of equity
jurisdiction there was always a limitation of suits in that court."
The demand is not to be favored, even for the amount actually
loaned, on account of the circumstances attending the negotiation,
and for the reason of the delay in either redeeming the land from
Rogers, or instituting proceedings for such redemption. In this
,case, on the part of the complainant, there is a want of cofiscience,
of good faith, and of reasonable diligence; and upon the principle
and spirit of the statute of limitations, and also of the policy of the
-country, this claim should not, at this late day, be enforced in a
-court of equity, against Rogers.
This suit was sought to be maintained on the ground that the
-equity of redemption of the Cleveland Insurance Company was not
'barred by the foreclosure of the Finch mortgages, as it was not made
a party defendant on the record of these cases. If this complainant
'had been nominally made a defendant in those cases, there would be
,no doubt of its foreclosure by those decrees, of all equity of redemption as a subsequent mortgagee, even if the proceeding had been
against it, by a newspaper publication of a rule to appear and plead,
-answer or demur, according to the statute. Why Edmund Clark
was made a defendant, and the Cleveland Insurance Company was
,omitted, cannot be accounted for, unless from the nature of the
several conveyances and the active agency of Clark in the negotiation, it was supposed that the mortgage was taken nominally in the
mame of the company for his use. In the whole business the name
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of the company only appears as payee of the notes and as mortgagee. The business was transacted by Clark, without authority
from the directors of the company, by a vote of the'corporate body.
There is no pretence that the directors entered on the minutes or
records of the corporation any resolution or order'authorizing Clark
to consummate the negotiation by those deeds to and from himself,
and to take the mortgage in the name of the company for double the
sum actually loaned. Clark swears "that he did not know whether
it was the funds of the company or his own funds that were advanced
to Reed, and also, that if the company would not advance the money
he would." From a subsequent examination of the books of the
compaliy and of memoranda, it may be inferred that the money
advanced was the funds of the corporation. Be this as it may,
Clark was the President of the company, the owner of the principal
part of the stock, and the business man of the company. Under
these circumstances, it was quite convenient for him to take a mortgage in the name of the corporation to secure a debt of his own,
particularly in such an unconscientious transaction. He had the
controlling power in the company. If he consulted the directors, it
was but mere matter of form. He was the company for all business
purposes, and he testifies that he and the company had notice by
their agent one or two years after the sale to Rogers, that Mr.
Rogers was in possession of the mortgaged premises claiming title.
If Rogers was claiming title, either by virtue of his purchase under
the decrees of foreclosure of the Finch mortgages, or by purchase at
sales for taxes, it was the duty of the Cleveland Insurance Company,
by its officers or agents, upon the receipt of the notice, to have
redeemed the land from those sales. They at the same time had
notice that the land was not considered worth over ten dollars per
acre, which would not warrant the expenses and disbursements
required for redemption. Under these circumstances it would not be
equitable or just to decree, at this late day, after the land has become
valuable, that Rogers' title and possession should be disturbed, for
the mere omission of the Cleveland Insurance Company as a nominal defendant in the bills and proceedings to foreclose prior mortgages.
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If the Finch mortgages had been foreclosed by a newspaper
advertisement and sale, in pursuance of authority in the mortgages,
the tileveland Insurance Company would have been entitled by law
to redeem within two years. By the law then in force, the mortgagor had two years time to redeem from such sale; and "any
person to whom a subsequent mortgage may have been executed,
shall be entitled to the same privilege of redemption to the mortgaged premises, that the mortgagee might have had, or of satisfying
the prior mortgage; and shall by such satisfaction acquire all the
benefits to which such prior mortgage was or might be entitled."
And the law directs that if the mortgaged premises so sold shall not
be redeemed, the officer making such sale shall make a deed to the
purchaser. And if there is an overplus of purchase money on hand,
it slhall be retained for subsequent incumbrances.
In the proceedings in court to foreclose the Finch mortgages,
Clark, as a non-resident not served with process, was entitled by
law to three years' time to come in and petition the court to open
the decree as to him, for the use of the insurance company. But
by the law, if such application be not made, the decree shall be
adjudged to be confirmed, which confirmation shall have relation to
the time of making the decree. And by law, land sold under execution was redeemable by the owner within two years after the sale;
and a creditor by judgment or decree could acquire the interests of
the purchaser within three months after. These several laws are
rules of property, strictly observed as to time in all cases; and
they are also laws of limitation. They fully demonstrate the policy
of the State in regard to sales of land for the payment of debts. In
the absence of laws limiting suits and proceedings in equity, the
laws of limitation as to similar demands in courts of law, are considered as rules proper to be observed in courts of chancery. From
analogy to these laws, it is questionable whether a subsequent mortgagee, not named as a party in a bill to foreclose a prior mortgage,
shall be allowed to redeem after two years. I am aware that the
opinion prevails, that such redemption cannot be denied, as the
person claiming it was no party to the proceedings in court. The
opinions of some courts favor this idea. But in several of the
States a proceeding in court, and a decree against the prior mort-
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gagor and terre tenant, are sufficient to bar all subsequent incumbrances. The proceedings in court are open; the advertisement
and sale are supposed to be known to all persons interested, who
should attend the sale and bid up the property to cover their liens.
Every person is expected to look after his mortgages and liens,
within a reasonable time. But whether a subsequent mortgagee
should be limited in equity to redeem within two years, by analogy
to the statute referred to, I need not now determine. But that he
should redeem within a reasonable time, there is no doubt. The
company, through its officers and agents, had notice of Rogers' possession under claim of title within two years after his purchase at
the master's sale in the foreclosure of the Finch mortgages. Inquiry
should then have been made into his right to possession and claim
of title; and the land should have been redeemed from the sale
within the two years, or a reasonable time after. The complainant
was under no disability to proceed on its mortgage, nor has Rogers
done any act to delay or prevent a redemption or sale of the land.
The complainant has done no act to enhance the value of the land,
while Rogers has. The complainant cannot be allowed to profit by
the delay, at Rogers' expense. For these reasons the court will not
order a decree on this bill, that would disturb the possession or title
of Rogers; or require him to pay the sum, with interest, advanced
to George Reed.
James H. Rogers disclaims title to, or interest in lots two and
three in section twenty-one, or in any undivided interest in those
lots; consequently there is no decree to be ordered against him as
to them. George Reed was discharged from his debt under the late
bankrupt law; and he is thereby released from all personal responsibility or liability on the notes and mortgage. The Milwaukee
and Mississippi Railroad Company, I presume, was made a defendant, for its claiming the right of way through section thirty. There
are no parties, then, that a decree could be made against, in regard
to the thirty-six acres in section twenty-one. But if that land was
sold under a decree in the case of Increase A. Lapham, as set forth
in Rogers' answer, I presume the complainant has no claim of lien
against it. If so, the bill will be dismissed as to both tracts. Bill
dismissed.

THE WM. K. PERRIN vs. THE LOUISIANA.

In the .District Court of the United Statesfor Maryland. March

Term, 1858.
BENJAMIN HANEY,

CHARLESJ OGDEN AND

JOHN TRENOHARD,

OWNERS

OF THE SCHOONER WM. K. PERRIN vs. THE STEAMER LOUISIANA AND
GEORGE W. RUSSELL, HER CAPTAIN.
1. Where a steamboat and sail vessel are approaching each other, and a collision
takes place between them, if there is mutual fault, theloss that is occasioned must

be divided.
2. A steamboat in the night time navigating the waters of a bay or river, must
always have a look-out, who, for the time, has no other duty or occupation.
3. The rules of navigation, as settled in ,St. ."ohn vs. Paine, 10 How. 583; 2T/e
Genesee Chief, 12 How. 461, and The Oregon vs. Roceo, re-affirmed and acted
upon.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
GiEs, J.-The libel in this case was filed to recover the value of
the schooner Win. K. Perrin, her cargo of oysters, and personal
property on board, consisting of schooner's furniture, master's
clothing, &c., amounting in all to between four and five thousand
dollars. The schooner was sunk, with every thing on board, on the
night of the 20th February last, in the Chesapeake Bay, in consequence of a collision with the steamer Louisiana.
The libellants, in their said libel, state that the collision occurred
in the following manner:
"That on Saturday, the 20th February, 1858, the said schooner
sailed from Drum Point Harbor, in the Patuxent river; and between
nine and ten o'clock that evening, while making her course down
the Chesapeake Bay, about five miles below the Rappahannock light
boat, she was run into by the steamer Louisiana, whose master the
said George W. Russell then was; and that said schooner was so
much injured that she sunk in three minutes, in deep water, and
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before any property could be saved from the vessel; and that the
said collision was the result of no want of care, negligence, seamanship, prudence or precaution on the part of the said master or crew
of the said schooner, but resulted altogether from the negligence,
default, misconduct and wrong of the master and crew of the said
steamer."
And they proved, by the depositions of Isaac Matthews and
Daniel B. Burrows, that the said schooner was two years old, and
was worth at the least $3,000 ; and that she would carry 200,000
oysters: 150,000 prime and 50,000 cullings. That the prime were
worth $7 per thousand, and the cullings $3 per thousand; or by
the bushel the oysters were worth $1 per bushel. And by the testimony of Kelly and Coney, that she carred 1,200 bushels; and
Coney also proved that her owners were to have one-third of the
gross value of her cargo, and the remaining two-thirds, after deducting expenses, were to be divided as follows : one-third to the captain (Ogden), one-third to the mate, and one-third to himself.
They also proved by William Miles, that he was mate on board
the " Win. K. Perrin," at the time of the collision, and had hold of
the tiller at the time'; that he was steering a due south course ; that
when he first saw the steamer she bore from the schooner south half
east, on the larboard bow; when the steamer came quite near, he
discovered that she was going more to the west, and would come
bows on to the schooner if some change of the course of the schooner
was not made; that he immediately shoved his helm down, and
called out to the men in the cabin to turn out; that the captain
jumped up and got on the helm with him, but that within two
seconds from the time he.shoved his helm down, the steamer struck
her, two feet aft the main rigging, and fifteen feet from the stern
on the larboard quarter; and the schooner sunk immediately, hardly
giving them time to save their lives by getting on board the steamer.
That the schooner was going at the time about six knots per hour,
and that Charles Corey was the ouily boy or person on deck with
him at the time, and he was forward. That he believed if he had
held on his course, and not ported his helm, the steamer would have
struck the schooner bows on.
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They also proved by Charles Corey, that he was forward, on the
larboard side of the said schooner, and when he saw the steamer
she was about three-fourths of a mile distant, and to the leeward of
them; thinks if they had held on their course the steamer would
have run into them bows on, but that they might have cleared the
steamer by putting up the schooner's helm; and that he called out
to Miles to do so, but received from him no answer.
Burrows, in his deposition, testified, that when he first saw the
steamer from his vessel, she was four and a half miles ahead, and
bore one point to leeward of his course; and at that time the
schooner "Win. K. Perrin" was about three-fourths of his (witness') schooner, and bore about a south-east course from it, and was
distant from the steamer about three miles and a half.
The claimants, in their answer, allege, that on the night of the
collision, the steamer Louisiana, being on her regular trip up the
Chesapeake Bay, from Norfolk, in Virginia, to Baltimore, heading
due north, discried said schooner at the distance of seven miles,
standing down the bay, and holding a course nearly due south; at
that time the schooner bore about two points to the east of north
from the starboard bow of the steamer. It was the captain's watch
on board the steamer ; and the second mate, a skillful officer, was
running the steamer, and was at his proper place in the wheelhouse, a position from which he had a full and perfect view ahead,
and on both sides of the steamer. That Captain Russell was on the
look-out, and several other persons were at the time on the deck
of the steamer; and it was certain, from the course of the two
vessels, that they would pass in safety at the distance of several
hundred yards, if no change was made in the course of either vessel.
That there was a pretty stiff breeze blowing at the time from N. N.
West, so that the schooner had a free and fair wind.
That when the schooner was within a hundred yards or thereabouts of being on a parallel line with the steamer, the schooner
put her helm down, which turned the head of the schooner towards
the western shore, and ran the schooner across the steamer's bows.
The instant this unexpected movement was perceived, the wheel of
the steamer was rapidly plied, so as to cause the steamer, as far as
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possible, to head towards the west, and at the same instant, orders
were given to stop, and back the steamer. Both of which orders
were promptly obeyed, but it was then impossible to prevent a collision. And that such a collision was the inevitable result of the
change of the schooner's course.
And the claimants proved by A. T. Ward, that he was the second
mate and pilot of the steamer, and was on board, and in the pilothouse on the night of the collision; and a black man was at the
wheel; the captain was on the deck. That he saw the schooner
three or four miles off, and that she was then half point on the
starboard bow of the steamer. When she got within 200 yards
of the steamer she bore north by east on his starboard bow. In
order to give plenty of room, he put the steamer's helm a-starboard,
and held a course north by west. After he had done this, he discovered that the schooner had altered her course to the west, and
was steering across the steamer's bows. That he then rang the
gong and signaled the engineer to stop the steamer, and hove his
wheel a-starboard to endeavor to come alongside of the schooner.
That if the schooner had held on her course she would have passed
two hundred yards to the east of the steamer. And that the schooner
when she changed her course was about one hundred yards from the
steamer. And by Mr. Rice, that he was on board the steamer on
the night of the collision, and came on deck after the gong sounded,
and that the schooner was then about seventy-five yards from
the steamer, and was standing to the west, and seemed to be wavering in her course, as though no one was at the helm; and that the
collision took place almost immediately afterwards.
I have thus given a brief outline of the allegations and testimony
on either side; and as it frequently occurs in collision cases, there is a
conflict as to the most important points in the case. But I am left
without the advice and information of experienced nautical men to
ascertain who was in fault on this occasion. This information from old
and experienced ship-masters is always within the reach of the judges
in the high court of admiralty in England, and who sit in that court
as the Trinity Masters. But in determining this question, I have
to guide me, rules of navigation which have been recognized through-
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out the commercial world, and have been sanctioned and adopted
by the Supreme Court. The first, and one of the most important of
these rules of navigation (in reference to the large increase of vessels propelled by steam) is, that" when meeting a sailing vessel, whether close hauled or with the wind free, the latter has a right to
keep her course; and it is the duty of the steamer to adopt such
precaution as will avoid her." See St. John vs. Paine and others,
10 How. 583. And that although just before a collision the master
of a sailing vessel may have given an order or executed a change in
the course of his vessel which was not judicious, yet this does not
excuse the steamer, because it had the power to have passed at a
safer distance, and had no right to place a sailing vessel in such
jeopardy that the error of a moment might cause her destruction.
See the case of the Genesee Chief, 12 How. 461. Another of these
rules is, that when two vessels, either steam or sailing vessels, are
approaching each other on parallel lines, or nearlyparallel, in opposite tacks, each vessel must, if there be danger of a collision, put
their helms to port, and pass on the larboardside of each other ;
and that this rule prevails when a steamer is meeting a sailing
vessel in all cases, except where the sailing vessel is so far on the
starboard bow of the steamer that its observance would, instead of
avoiding, tend to bring about a collision, by causing the steamer to
cross the bows of the sailing vessel. See the case of the Rose, 2
W. Robertson, 4. Wheeler vs. Steamer Eastern State, 2 Curtis,
144. Steamer Oregon vs. Boeco and others, 18 How. 572. St.
John vs. Paine, 10 How. 584.
Now, in this case it is by no means clear, from the evidence, that
if the schooner's course had not been changed a few seconds before
the collision, that it would not have taken place. I think, therefore, that the steamer was wrong, when she had such wide waters
around her, in running so close to the schooner, that if she had not
changed her course, the steamer must have passed within a hundred
yards of her, if not over her, as two of the witnesses believed.
I think the steamer was also wrong in attempting to pass to the
west, or on the starboard side of the schooner; for, although it may
be as the pilot, Ward, testified, that the schooner was half or one
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point on the starboard bow of the steamer, yet the steamer should
have ported her helm and passed on the larboard side of the
schooner. For, if this rule of navigation be strictly enforced and
generally acted on, every vessel can govern itself accordingly when
approaching another, and many disastrous collisions may be avoided.
I think also, there was gross want of skill and proper caution on
the part of Miles, who was at the helm of the schooner at the time
of the collision. According to his own testimony he saw the steamer
was westing on him, (to use his own language) and knew that her
speed was more than double that of the schooner, and when within
one hundred yards of the steamer he attempted to go to the west of
her, instead of putting his helm up and going to the east, which according to Corey's testimony should have been done, and would
have avoided the collision; and this, too, after Corey, who was on
the look-out on the schooner, had called to him to put his helm up.
This, then, makes a case of mutual fault, and I shall decide the loss
as the Supreme Court did in the case of the Schooner Catharinevs.
Dickerson, 17 How. 176, Bogers and others vs. Steamer St.
Charles, 19 How. 108.
Before passing from this case, I would remark that if this collision had occurred without the schooner having been seen by persons
on board the steamer until it was too late to avoid it, it would have
been my duty to have decided the case against the steamer, without
inquiring into any other circumstance of the collision. And for
the reason, that on the night in question, the steamer had no proper
look-out; for the pilot, Ward, testified that he was on the look-out.
And the Supreme Court have again and again decided that a lookout must be one exclusively employed in. watching the movements of
vessels which they are meeting, or about to pass; and must have for
the time no other occupationor duty. See 12 How. 462 ; 10 How.
585, and 18 How. 225. 1 am surprised that this steamer, that has
been so well managed in all that pertains to the comfort and convenience of her passengers, and has gained so large a share of the
public confidence, should be found running on this occasion without
such a look-out on deck.

MORRIS CANAL AND BANKING CO. vs. LEWIS.

New Jersey Court of Appeals-March Term, 1858.
THE MORRIS CANAL AND BANKING COMPANY, APPELLANTS Vs. GEORGE
T. LEWIS, RESPONDENT.
1; Railroad or canal bonds, with coupons, deposited as collaterals for the payment
of promissory notes, may be sold, if the notes are not paid at maturity, the presumption being that such was the intention of the parties.
2. Without a spdcial agreement to that effect, ordinary bonds and mortgages, or
promissory notes, deposited as collaterals, cannot be sold to raise the money.

The bill in this case was filed in the Court of Chancery of New
Jersey, by the respondent, who held several coupon bonds of the
Morris Canal and Banking Company, which were due, to obtain a
decree for their payment. The chancellor made his decree, ordering
the revenue of the company to be sequestered until the money is
paid; whereupon the company appealed.
The unanimous opinion of the court was delivered by
ELMER, J.-It was held by this court in the case of The MAorris
Canal and Banking Company vs. Fisher,1 Stock. 667 & 3 Am. L.
Reg. 423, that the coupon bonds of the company are transferable
by delivery, so that a bona fide holder has a good title to them;
and this principle has since been recognized as correct by other
courts. It rests upon the facts that such bonds are expressly
designed to be thus circulated, and to be sold in the stock market
like public securities; and that they are universally so used. When
bonds of such a character, having several years to run before they
become due, are deposited as collateral security for the payment of
promissory notes soon to mature, the fair presumption is that they
were designed to be held as a pledge, and were expected to be sold,
after demand and due notice, like goods and chattels, stocks and
public securities, in case the debt for which they were pledged should
not be punctually paid. Such a deposit differs entirely from a
deposit of ordinary bonds, mortgages, promissory notes, or like
choses in action, which, in the absence of an agreement to that
effect, the creditor cannot expose to sale, because they have no
market value, and it cannot be presumed it was the intention of the
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parties thus to deal with them. The reasoning of the judge in the
case of Wheeler vs. NVewbold, 5 Duer, 29, goes to this extent,
although the case itself decides only that a sale of pledged property,
to be valid, must be public, and be preceded by a demand of payment, and a reasonable notice of the time and place of sale.
The bonds now in question, were deposited by the appellants as
collaterals, for the payment of two notes of theirs given to J. P.
Morris & Co. Besides the presumption arising from the nature of
the deposits, the correspondence between these parties, we think,
establishes beyond all reasonable doubt, that they expected them to
be sold to raise the money, if the notes were not paid when they
became due. (Here follow extracts from the correspondence, ending
with a formal notice of the time and place of sale, to which there
was no reply.)
Whatever may have been the president's personal views, or the
real intentions of the board of directors, the correspondence will
admit of but one meaning. Morris & Co. and the respondent, to
whom it appears it was shown, must have understood them as intimating that they had no objection to make to the proposed sale.
To permit them now to complain that they did not so intend, would
be to permit them to take advantage of their own silence when they
were bound to speak. In Batten on Specific Performance 88, (7Law
Lib. 69) the author states the principle to be deduced from the authorities in equity to be: "when a person has tacitly encouraged the act
being done, or has consented to it, he shall not exercise his legal
right in opposition to that consent." Upon this just principle, if
it was admitted that when the bonds were deposited it was not
intended that they should be sold, the cpmpany would be estopped
by the correspondence from withdrawing their consent, after the
sale had taken place.
Robert Adams, to whom the bonds were publicly bid off and sold,
transferred his bid on the next day to Morris & Co., who thus
became the absolute owners of them, and credited the amount they
produced on the notes held by them. There is no proof that Adams
purchased them for Morris & Co., or otherwise than in a fair and
bona fide manner. It is therefore not nqcessary to determine
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whether Morris & Co. had a right to purchase at the sale made by
their own order and for their own benefit. The title of Adams,
although not so perfected as to enable him to take possession of the
bonds until he paid for them, was the title of a bona fide purchaser,
which he had a right to transfer to any subsequent purchaser, who
thus took his place as a bona fide holder. It does not distinctly
appear of whom the respondent purchased the bonds; but as it does
appear that Morris & Co. had acquired a perfect title to them, it is
no defence if he purchased of them, and if, as was insisted, he was
n6tified before he did so, that the company objected to the sale.
The decree of the chancellor must be affirmed, with costs.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
ROGERS YT AL..VS. GrLLINGER ET AL.

The fragments of a building blown down by a tempest are not thereby converted
into personalty, but pass to the purchaser of the realty at sheriff's sale.

This case came up on a writ of error to the Common Pleas of
Bucks county.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-The owner of a lot of ground, upon which had been
erected a large frame building, conveyed the property to assignees
in trust for the benefit of creditors. Prior to the assignment, a
judgment had been recovered against the assignor, which was a lien
upon the real estate conveyed. Two days after the assignment had
been made, a storm of wind demolished the building, leaving the
foundation and walls nearly entire, but breaking the superstruction
so that its materials could not be replaced, or used in the construction of a similar building. While in this condition the whole was
levied upon and sold under executions founded upon the judgment
against the assignor, and the voluntary assignees now claim that
the ruins of the frame.building did not pass at the sheriff's sale, that
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they were personal property, and that the purchaser under the venditioni exponas, having used them, is responsible to the assignees in
an action of trover.
It may be premised that the assignebs stand precisely in the shoes
of Beek, the first owner. If he could not assert against the purchaser at sheriff's sale, supposing no assignment had been made,
that the fragments of the building were personalty, neither can
they. It may also be remarked that the purchaser under the judgment has obtained all upon which the judgment was a lien.
Now, clearly, Beek, the first owner, could not have torn down
the building, and converted the materials from realty into personalty, without diminishing the security of the judgment, impairing
its lien, and wronging the judgment creditor. Though the statutory
writ of estrepement might not have been demandable until after
levy and condemnation of the property, yet equity would have
enjoined against such wrong. The building, as such, constituted a
large part of the creditor's security, and his lien embraced every
board and rafter which made a constitutent part of the structure.
Nor were the rights of the assignees any more extensive. They
were mere volunteers. They took the property as land only, incumbered as a whole and in every part by the lien of the judgment.
Their title was, in one sense, subordinate to the right of the judgment creditor to take all which passed to them in satisfaction of his
debt.
In Heekelander's case, -4 Rep. 63, a., it was resolved that if
a lessee pulls down a house, the lessor may take the timber as a
thing which was parcel of his inheritance. So in Bowle's case, 11
Rep. 81, b., it was held that if the lessee cut down timber, the lessor
may take it; though severed, it is a parcel of the inheritance.
Nor will the tortious act of a stranger be allowed to injure the
reversion. 2 M. & S. 494; 6 Term Rep. 55; 1 Vesey, 524;
Genth vs. Sir John Cotton. These principles are re-asserted in
Shult vs. Barker, 12 S. & R. 272; 7 Conn. 232; 3 Wendell, 104.
Nor will a severance by the owner of that which was a part of
the realty, unless the severance be with the intent to change the
character of the thing severed and convert it into personalty, pre-
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vent its passing with the land to a grantee. Thus it was held in
Goodrich vs. Jones, 2 Hill, 142, that fencing materials on a frame
which have been used as part of the fences, but are temporarily
detached without any intent to divest them from their use as such,
are a part of the freehold, and as such pass by a conveyance of the
farm to a purchaser.
Is the rule-different when the severance occurs, not by a tortious
act, nor by a rightful exercise of proprietorship, without any intent
to divest the thing severed from its original use, but by the act of
God? The act of God, it is said, shall prejudice none. 4 Co. 86,
b. 'Yet the maxim is not true if a tempest be permitted to take
away the security of a lien creditor, and transfer that which was
his to the debtor or debtor's assignees. If trees are prostrated per
vim venti, they belong to the owner of the inheritance, not to the
lessee. Heckelander's case, ut supra. He takes them as a part of
the realty. True, he may elect to consider them as personalty,
and this he does when he brings trover for their conversion, but,
until such election, they belong to him as parcel of the inheritance.
If a tenant hold "without impeachment of waste," the property
in the timber is in him; but if there be no such clause in his lease,
and he remove from the land trees blown down, such removal is
waste. That could not, however, be, unless, notwithstanding the
severance, they continue part of the realty, for waste is an injury
to the realty.
I am aware that it is said to have been held that if an apple tree
be blown down, and the tenant cut it, it is no waste. 2 Rolle Ab.
820. That may well be, for the falling of the tree is through the
act of God, not of the tenant, and the cutting of the fallen tree is
but an exercise of the tenant's right to estovers; but if he remove
from the land fallen timber, it has been ruled to be waste.
What, then, is the criterion by which we are to determine whether
that which was once a part of the realty has become personalty on
being detached? Not capability of restoration to the former connection with the freehold, as is contended, for the tree, prostrated
by the tempest, is incapable of re-annexation to the soil, and yet
remains realty. The true rule would rather seem to be, that which
was real shall continue real until the owner of the freehold shall, by
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his election, give it a different charater. In Shepherd's Touchstone
so it is laid down, that that which is parcel, or of the essence of the
thing, although at the time of the grant it be actually severed from
it, does pass by a grant of the thing itself. And, therefore, by the
grant of a mill, the millstone doth pass, although at the time of the
grant it be actually severed from the mill; so by the grant of a
house, the doors, windows, locks and keys do pass as parcel thereof,
although at the time of the grant they be actually severed from it.
It must be admitted that the case before us is one almost of the
first impression, very little assistance can be derived from past judicial decisions. There 'is supposed to be some analogy between the
character of these fragments of the building and that of a displaced
fixture. The analogy, however, if any, is very slight. These broken
materials never were fixtures, though they had been fixed to the land.
They had been as much land as the soil on which they rested;.
severance had never been contemplated. One of the best deflnitions
of fixtures is that found in Nheen vs. Ricie, 5 Mees. &Wels. 171..
They are those personal chattels which have been annexed to the.
freehold, but which are removable at the will of the person who has
annexed them, or his personal representatives, though the property
in the freehold may have passed to another person; yet even fixtures, which but imperfectly partake of the character of realty, go
to the purchaser at sheriff's sale of land, though they have been
severed tortiously, or by the act of God.
Thus, where a copper kettle had been detached from its site in a
brewery, by one not the owner, had remained detached for a long
period, and while thus severed had been pledged by the personal.
representatives of the owner, it was still, held to have passed by &
sheriff's sale of the brewery under a mechanics' lien filed before the.
severance. Gray vs. Hold~shi, 17 S. & R. 413.
Without, however, discussing the question further, it will be perceived that, in our opinion, the broken materials of the fallen building must be considered as parcel of the realty, as between theassignees and purchaser at sheriff's sale, and consequently that they
passed by the sale to the purchaser.
The judgment is affirmed.
28
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WOOD vs. BLANCHARD.

SuTreme Court of llinois- ovember Term, 1857-at
Mount TVernon.
JOHN WOOD VS. ISRAEL :BLANOHARD.
1. When the legislative will can .be ascertained, from different enactments, they

should be so construed as to make that will effective, although no express language is used which declares such legislative .will.
2. The law-making power may continue or create an office, without an express declaraton that such office shall be continued or created, if the intention to do so
is manifested by requiring official sets to be performed by such officer, or if provision is made for filling vacancies in such office.

This was an action of trespass vi et armis, by BlanchardZ against
Wood. The defendant pleaded specially, that he was acting as
coroner, and made the levy complained of by virtue of his oice,
and by virtue of an execution placed in his hands as such coroner.
To this plea there was a demurrer, which was sustained in the court
below, on the ground that there was no such officer as coroner
known to the constitution and laws of the State of Illinois.
CATON, Ch. J. Have we a coroner now ? This is the only question presented by this record. The old constitution created the
'office of coroner; 'the mode of whose election, and whose duties
were prescribed by subsequent acts of the legislature. The old
constitution was superseded and practically repealed by the new;
which omitted to create the office of coroner. It is not denied that
the legislature has the power, under the new constitution, to create
the office; but, as that has not been done in express terms, it is
insisted that there has been no such officer since the adoption of
the new constitution.
This argument is at least specious, but we think that a close
examination of the subject will show that it is not sound. So far
as the facts assumed in this argument are concerned, they are true,
but there are other facts which it overlooks, and which are important to be considered in the determination of this question.
It is not necessary in all cases, that the legislature
should, in
.explicit and affirmative terms, declare its will, in order to make that
will the law. Where the legislative will is 6learly and manifestly
indicated by its enactments, such intention may be held to be the
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law, though the legislature should, through inadvertence, have
failed, in explicit and affirmative terms, to declare such intention.
True, we must look to the language which it has used in order to
ascertain its will; but if,from what it has said in the form of
enactments, we can unmistakably ascertain its intention, it becomes
the duty of the courts to declare and enforce such intention. If
there be such an office as coroner in this State, it must depend for
its existence upon legislative enactments, either those adopted by
the constitution, or since passed, or upon constitutional inference ;
for, as before remarked, it is not expressly created by the constitution. The election law, and the law concerning sheriffs and coroners, of 1845, provide for the election of coroners, and prescribe
their duties. Although the old constitution created the office, these
laws would be ample, without its aid, to do so; but it is not to be
denied that they were passed with a view to fill the office already
created, rather than creating it. Still, as the new constitution expressly continued in force all previous laws not inconsistent with it,
it has certainly continued these former laws in force. The legislature had the right to enact precisely such laws as these under the
new constitution, and had this been done, it would thereby have
created the office of coroner, and prescribed his duties beyond all
question. We then ask, confidently, whether the convention did
not do the same thing, by continuing those old laws in force ? Suppose the schedule to the constitution had declared in express terms
that the laws then force, providing for the election of coroners and
prescribing their duties, should continue in force till altered or repealed by the legislature, who could truthfully deny that it was the
intention of the convention that the office of coroner should continue to exist? So that, we think, we may truly say that, if the
legislature, in passing those laws, did not intend to create the office
of coroner, the convention by continuing them in force, did intend
to continue that office in existence, subject to the control of the
legislature. The language of the first section of the schedule of
the new constitution, is this, "That all laws in force at the adoption
of this constitution, not inconsistent therewith, shall continue and
be as valid as if this constitution had not been adopted." Now,

WOOD vs. BLANCHARD.

when we admit that the legislature might, under the new constitution, have enacted just such laws as those referred to, we admit that
those laws are not inconsistent with the constitution, for the legislature could not pass any law inconsistent with it. If, then, they
are not inconsistent with it, they are declared to be as valid as if
the constitution had not been adopted. All the laws thus continued
in force, are, strictly speaking, re-enactments by the convention,
and we therefore look to that for their validity. We repeat, therefore, that we are warranted in saying that the office of coroner was
continued by the adoption of the new constitution.
But this is not all; we have further, and, if need be, still more
direct proof that the office of coroner should still continue after the
adoption of the new constitution. The fourteenth section of the
schedule is as follows: "That if this constitution shall be ratified
by the people, the Governor shall forthwith, after having ascertained the fact, issue writs of election to the sheriffs of the several
counties of this State; or, in case of vacancy, to the coroners, for
the election of all the officers whose election is fixed by this constitution or schedule; and it shall be the duty of said sheriffs or coroners to give at least twenty days notice of the time and place of
said election, in the manner now prescribed by law." Now, here
the convention itself recognizes the existence of the office of coroner
after the old constitution should be superseded by the new; for it
required of coroners official acts after it should be ratified by the
people, and when in full and complete operation. We should subject the convention to the charge of a very strange absurdity, indeed,
if we say it intended to abolish the office of coroner absolutely, and
that all the coroners in the State should cease to be officers the
moment the new constitution took effect, while it still required them
to perform official acts after that time. In the face of these provisions, it is not to be denied that it was the affirmative will and positive intention of the convention, in framing the constitution, and of
the people in adopting it, that the office of coroner should continue
to exist, and that all the coroners then in office should continue
after the adoption of the new constitution. If the office continued
for a single moment, after the adoption of the new constitution, it
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still continues, unless it has since been abolished by competent
authority. If they were coroners, so as to give notice of the elections under the new constitution, as required by that instrument,
when, since then, has the office been abrogated? Suppose the governor had listened to the specious argument that the new constitution had abolished the office of coroner, and had refused to send
writs of election to coroners in counties where the office of sheriff
was vacant, substantially telling the convention and the people that
they did not know what they were about when they ordered him to
do so, and that they had unwittingly, no doubt, left every county
in the State without a coroner or any other officer to take his place,
would he not have been justly charged with captiousness? And
now we are, in fact, asked to do substantially the same thing.
But the Legislature, subsequent to the adoption of the new constitution, has not been entirely silent on this subject. At the
second session of the first Legislature convened under this new constitution, an act was passed which provided "that whenever a
vacancy shall happen in the office of sheriff, county surveyor or
coroner, of any county in this State," the clerk shall give notice to
the Governor, who shall issue writs of election, &c. Now, here the
Legislature, without deeming it necessary to create the office of
coroner, recognize it as already existing, and provide for filling
vacancies which may occur in it.
It may be said with truth, that in none of the provisions of the
constitution or the statutes to which I have referred, is the office
expressly created as it was in the old constitution, and I presume
that no such provision exists; but there is an implication, from the
language used in both, so pregnant as to leave no doubt on the mind
of any one, that it was the deliberate and affirmative will of the
competent law making powers, that the old office of coroner should
continue after the adoption of the new constitution, as it before
existed; that it acquires the force of a positive enactment to that
effect.
When the constitution requires that the coroner shall do certain
official acts at a particular time, it in effect declares that there shall
be an office at that time, which may be filled by such an officer.
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When the Legislature provided for the election of coroners to fill
vacancies in that office, it manifested an indisputable intention that
there should be such an office, which might become vacant; which,
if we exercise our common understanding, we can no more ignore
than we could an express provision to that effect. It is the object
of construction to find out the real intention of the writer from the
language used, and, in construing statutes, we study their language
and carefully consider every word, discarding none as useless, if
possible, in order to find out the true meaning or will of the law
giver, and when that is ascertained, we know what the law is, and
must so declare it. Now, unless we hold there is such an office as
coroner, then we must declare that all the constitution says, and
all the statute says about this office, is mere idle verbiage, without
purpose or meaning. We are not prepared to reject all this as
meaningless, but are of opinion that the provisions referred to were
inserted for a purpose, which it is the duty of the court to
effectuate.
As a case most directly in point, and a stronger one than this,
where this court gave effect to the manifest will of the Legislature
in the absence of any positive enactment declaring such will, but
where it had to be gathered from various statutes, we refer to that
of The People vs. Thurber, 13 Ill. R. 554. There no express provision could be found, either in the constitution or the statute,
declaring who should be the successor to the clerk of the county
commissioners' court, which was abolished by the new constitution.
The laws had imposed a great variety of ex officio duties upon that
officer, in no way connected with the business of the court of which
he was clerk, but which the very continuance of the government
required should be performed by some one, and no law could be
found declaring who should perform those duties after that office
was abolished. After examining a great variety of acts, it became
so apparent that the Legislature supposed and intended, and so
willed, that the clerk of the new County Court should, in all things,
succeed to the duties of the clerk of the County Commissioners'
Court, that we did not hesitate to declare that such was the law.
To have declared otherwise would have defeated the clear will and
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intention of the Legislature. So here, should we now declare that
there is no such office as coroner, we should, beyond all doubt or
controversy, defeat the obvious and manifest will and intention of
both the convention and the Legislature, which is clearly manifested
by the laws which they and the people, by their vote, have enacted.
This, as we understand our duty, we ought not to do.
We freely confess we are glad that we find ourselves fully authorized to hold that the office of coroner still continues; for to hold
that there has been no such officer in this State for the last nine
years, and that all which has been done by those who were supposed
to be coroners, was utterly void, would involve the whole community
in calamities which it would be impossible now to estimate.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

Supreme Court of lllinois-Bovember Term, 1858.
Vernon.

At Mount

THOMAS RODNEY VS. THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY.
I. The constitution of Illinois prohibits slavery; therefore, negroes within its jurisdiction are supposed to be free.
2. The State of Illinois being an independent sovereignty, will determine for itself
the condition of all persons within its territory; subject to the constitution of the
United States, and the laws made under the authority of that instrument.
3. Slavery is the creation of municipal regulations in States where it exists, and
such regulations have no extra territorial operation or binding force in another
sovereignty.
4. The laws of other States recognizing slavery, being repugnant to the laws and
policy of the institutions of Illinois, neither the law of nations nor the comity of
States can affect the condition of a fugitive in Illinois, so as to give the owner
any property in, or control over him, by force of any state authority.
5. The remedy in matters connected with fugitive slaves, is to be found under acts
of Congress, and in the courts of the United States.
6. Property in persons being repugnant to the constitution and laws of Illinois,
trover cannot be maintained for the recovery of a person, or for satisfaction for
the loss.

RODNEY vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

The facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the
court, which was delivered by
SKn'NER, J.-The plaintiff sued the Illinois Central Railroad
Company in case, for receiving as a passenger on their road, at
Cairo, in this State, the negro slave of the plaintiff, held to service
under the laws of Missouri, knowing the negro was the plaintiff's
slave under the laws of the State of Missouri, escaping from his
service, and carrying the negro, as such passenger, to Chicago;
thereby, in this State, aiding the fugitive to escape from service.
The declaration also contains a count in trover for the conversion,
by the defendants, in this State, of the plaintiff's slave, held. to service under the laws of Missouri.
The court sustained a demurrer to the declaration, and upon this
decision the assignments of error are founded.
The constitution of this State prohibits negro slavery, and, therefore, negroes within our jurisdiction are presumed to be free. BHone
vs. Ammons, 14 flls. 27 ; Bailey vs. Cromwel, 3 Scam. 71; Xinney vs. Cook, Ib. 232.
The State of Illinois, as one of the independent sovereignties of
the Union, will determine the condition of all persons within the
State, according to her own laws and institutions, and can be limited
or controlled in this respect only by the constitution of the United
States, and the laws of Congress made under authority of that
instrument.
Slavery, in the States where it exists, has its foundation in the
municipal regulations of such States which have no extra-territorial
operation, and no binding force in another sovereignty.
The law of Missouri, under which the negro owes service to the
plaintiff, being repugnant to our law and the policy of our institutions, neither, by the law of nations or the comity of States, can
affect the condition of the fugitive slave in this State, or, within our
jurisdiction, give the owner any property in or control over him.
The constitution of the State is here the paramount law, except in
so far as the constitution of the United States, or the powers therein
-delegated to Congress, may limit or control its operation. The
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owner, therefore, by force of the laws of another State, under the
law of Illinois, has no property in the fugitive, and can here, under
State authority, assert no property in or power over him. Jones vs.
Vandant, 2 McLean R. 596; ailtner vs. Gorham, 4 Id. 402;
Prigg vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,16 Peters R. 539.
The constitution of the United States, however, gives the owner
the right of reclamation of his slave, escaping from service, wherever
he may be found within the United States; and Congress, under
the authority of this clause, and in the rightful exercise of power, to
render the provision effectual, and to afford ample and uniform
remedy for recaption and return of fugitive slaves, by the act of
1793, provided for the recaption and surrender of fugitive slaves
within the States and Territories of the Union, imposed penalties for
aiding the escape of such fugitives, and for opposing or interrupting
the reclamation under the remedies given the owner. By the terms
of that act, concurrent jurisdiction seems to have been conferred
upon federal and State tribunals.
By the act of Congress of 1850, on the same subject, the right of
the owner to reclaim his fugitive slave is declared; remedies for
recaption and return of the fugitive to the State or Territory whence
he may have fled, are provided; punishments for obstructing recaption and return, and for harboring or concealing the fugitive to prevent recaption, are provided; and damages for the injury, by way
of penalty, are given to the owner, to be recovered by action in the
district or territorial courts of the United States, where the offence
is committed. The act of 1850, by necessary implication, repeals
the act of 1793 so far as the provisions of the former conflict with
the latter, whether the conflict consists in remedies given or penalties imposed. The act of 1850 not only provides different remedies,
penalties and modes of procedure, but names the forums in which
they may be enforced; and therefore, aside from the question of
power of Congress to confer jurisdiction upon State tribunals, it
would seem they intended to confine-in execution of the federal
laws upon the subject-jurisdiction to the federal courts.
The constitution of the United States vests the federal judicial
power in the Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as Congress
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may see fit to establish; and provides that the judicial power shall
extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under the constitution and laws of the United States,- Constitution of the United
States,. Art. 3.
The federal courts, therefore, are the proper forums for causesarising under the constitution of the United States, and the laws of
Congress made under its authority; and the State tribunals (at least
unless jurisdiction is expressly conferred) cannot take cognizance of
such causes.
If, however, the State court has jurisdiction of the cause under
the common or statutory law of the State, the federal constitution
or laws coming incidentally in question, will be recognized and
enforced. Martinvs. Hunter, 1 Wheaton, 336; Houston vs. Moore,
5 Tb. 49; Story's Com. on Constitution, sects. 1,759 to 1,755; 1
Kent's Com. 396 to 405; United States vs. Lathrop, IT John. R. 4.
See also Prigg vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Moore vs.
The People, 14 Howard U. S. R. 13; Thornton's Case, 11 Ill. 332.
The count in trover cannot be sustained for the reason stated.
Property in persons being repugnant to our laws and the genius of
our State institutions, our courts will not enforce, as a general rule,
the laws of other States recognizing this species of property, where
the cause of action, based upon such laws, arises in this State.
Hone vs. Ammons, 14 Ill. 29.
Trover is brought for the wrongful conversion to another's use,
of one's personal property, and judgment therein for damages, with
satisfaction, vests in the defendant the property converted. The
plaintiff, under the local law where the alleged conversion occurred,
had no property in the negro, and none under that law, by force
of a recovery in the action and satisfaction, could vest in the
defendant.
Judgment affirmed.

CAMP vs. TELEGRAPH COMPANY.

_In the Louisville (Ky.) Chancery Court, March, 1858.
CAMP VS. THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.

1. Where a telegraphic communication was sent subject to the express condition
that the telegraph company would not be liable for mistakes arising from any
cause unless the message -was repeated by being sent back; it was held, that the
plaintiff was bound by his contract, and could not recover unless he brought him-

self within the terms of the company's undertaking.
2. Telegraphic companies are not, in any just sense, common carriers, and cannot
be made liable upon the principles applied to carriers.

The opinion of the court in which the facts sufficiently appear
was delivered by
J.-If the plaintiff was not legally liable to pay Gibson
& Co. sixteen cents for the whiskey which was sent him, he would
have had no pretext, in any view of this case, for recovering the
damages alleged to have been incurred in consequence of his proposition being incorrectly and erroneously transmitted through the
agency of defendant.
I shall not inquire whether the plaintiff was liable for the consequence of the unauthorized proposition communicated through defendant's mistake to Gibson & Co.
For, admitting that defendant, though a special agent to convey
a particular proposition, could and did, by erroneously conveying a
different proposition, impose upon plaintiff a liability proportioned
to the difference between the authorized and the unauthorized proposition, which liability would not have been incurred but for the
mistake committed by defendant, it does not follow that plaintiff can
recover the amount of said liability in this action.
The plaintiff avers that defendant agreed to transmit to Gibson
& Co. a certain message, and failed to transmit it correctly; in this,
that the message agreed to be sent was to pay fifteen cents per
gallon for certain whiskey; whereas, the message actually delivered
'vas to pay sixteen cents per gallon.
LOGAN,
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There is no allegation that the failure to deliver the message correctly was the result of negligence.
It appears that the failure to deliver the message was the result
of a mistake to which, from the very nature of telegraphic operations, communications are liable; and that the message in this case
was sent subject to the express condition that defendant would not
be liable for mistakes arising from any cause, unless the message
was repeated by being sent back.
I see no ground for saying that this condition was void. Without this precaution of repeating messages, mistakes by telegraph
are unavoidable. And there is no principle of public policy that
does or should prohibit a telegraph company from being prudent
enough to protect themselves from ruin, by requiring such a condition in the transmission of messages.
Had the message been repeated in this instance, the mistake
would probably not have occurred, and it is idle to say that the
defendant was bound, for a compensation of fifty cents, to insure
the message, unconditionally and absolutely, against all mistakes.
The points of difference between the nature of telegraph companies and the nature of common carriers are so numerous and so
obvious as to render the unqualified application of the law of common carries to telegraph companies delusive and dangerous.
But even in the case of common carriers, special agreements
limiting liability, may be made.
If, however, special limitations of common law liability were
always void in the case of common carriers, this would be no
reason to hold a limitation void in respect to telegraph companies.
The rule and mode of compensation charged by telegraphic
offices, the secret nature of messages, and the impossibility of determining the value of them, or the pecuniary consequences of mistakes and miscarriages, and the peculiar liability of telegraphic
communications to mistakes, would furnish ample reason for exempting them from the strict operation of the old law of common
carriers.
Telegraphic messages are paid for by the line or the word9

